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   nnovation Research IAbstract: 
Although fundamental innovations can make especially important contributions 
to the environmental soundness of economic progress, they are often impeded 
by path dependency and lock-in on the part of established technologies. 
Because the intensity of the latter effect changes in time, it is possible to identify 
and strategically use windows of opportunity – periods in which a successful 
transition is greatly facilitated.  
In the case of the mobile fuel cell, economies of scale, learning and network 
effects are among the most important techno-economic determinants of such a 
window. Other more political determinants are political guidance and supra-
national agreements. All effects were combined to form a time strategy that 
allows innovation policy to effectively push the new technology at the lowest 
possible cost for the economy. 
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1 Introduction 
Political intervention in the development of innovative systems is not a rare 
phenomenon. It could even be considered the norm in the case of innovations 
related to environmental protection since, by their very nature, these 
technologies only allow for a limited internalisation of their benefits by the 
innovator and therefore need at least temporary support. However, there is 
frequent complaint that such interventions take place at the wrong time, used 
inappropriate instruments, and the time horizon employed was inadequate 
(Klemmer et al. 1999). 
One cause of such inadequacy is due to the risk that a technology originally 
chosen for its environmental advantageousness may later turn out to cause 
environmental damage on its own. Due to the uncertainty associated with any 
kind of innovation process, this failure is fundamentally unavoidable. The only 
way to circumvent the corresponding adverse consequences consists in 
keeping the technological development flexible such that a new technology can 
substitute for an existing technology when ever necessary. Sartorius (2006) 
calls this adaptiveness ‘second-order’ sustainability since it is the necessary 
condition for transitions towards more sustainable technologies (i.e. first-order 
sustainability) being achieved at a sufficiently high rate.  
This leads to the second kind of problem related to technological change: the 
difficulty to leave an existing technology path that happens to be predetermined 
and stabilised by path dependency and lock-in (David 1985). In contrast to 
uncertainty, the causes of path dependency and lock-in can well be specified 
and most of them are deterministic by their nature. In addition, they are subject 
to change in time such that it should be possible to identify and even predict so-
called ‘windows of opportunity’ in which the resistance to technological change 
is lowest and thus political intervention can achieve the optimum effect with 
regard to cost and benefit (Zundel et al. 2005a). In some cases, the strategic 
use of those windows may even go so far as to influence their appearance 
directly – by bringing about the right conditions for an innovative technology 
path to diffuse or by forcing a technology into existence in the first place. In any 
case, knowing about the exact nature and intensity of the resistance to change 
may enable the identification of those measures by means of which the lock-in 
can be overcome, and the window used, most effectively. 
In order to demonstrate the working and operability of the latter approach, the 
fuel cell as a component of automobile propulsion systems appears to be a very 2  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
promising case because it is characterised by both significant environmental 
effects on a global level and pronounced lock-out with respect to the existing 
technology. The latter point comes to bear especially in the combination of the 
mobile fuel cell with a hydrogen infrastructure which, depending on the 
respective political standpoint, is praised for its resource-preserving low specific 
energy consumption, its climate-protecting lack of greenhouse gas emissions or 
its abatement of the emission of pollutants that affect health and environment 
on a local level. Due to its potentially high costs, such an alternative fuel 
infrastructure can strongly affect the demand for fuel cell vehicles, leading to 
successful commercialisation of the automobile fuel cell in the best case and to 
a complete failure in the worst case. Under these circumstances, the 
development of a time strategy can be decisive because it may represent the 
only way to keep the installation effort low enough to make the simultaneous 
implementation of two radically new, interacting technologies – fuel cell and 
hydrogen – appear economically reasonable and affordable. 
In order to develop a time strategy for the effective implementation of the 
automobile fuel cell, this paper proceeds as follows. After elucidating the theory 
behind technology stabilisation (‘lock-in’) and windows of opportunity (in section 
2), a set of determinants of such windows (and indicators for their analysis) is 
presented (in section 3). Before this set is eventually used for the thorough 
analysis of the fuel cell technology and a complementary hydrogen 
infrastructure (in section 5), methodological aspects of case study selection and 
data collection are presented in section 4. Based on the results from section 5, 
a time strategy for a successful innovation policy with regard to fuel cell-driven 
cars in a hydrogen infrastructure is developed in section 6. Finally, section 7 
concludes. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  3 
 
2  Radical innovations, lock-in and ‘windows of 
opportunity’ 
According to Dosi (1982, 1988), technological progress typically proceeds in 
either one of two different ways. The majority of innovations are brought about 
by the systematic or accidental change of a small number of parameters within 
a given technological paradigm, that is, within a specific technical ‘pattern’ for 
the solution of a given techno-economic problem that is usually based on a 
narrow set of scientific principles and, thus, on a small number of basic 
innovations (Dosi 1988: 224). Such change along a technological trajectory is 
gradual and, although its outcome is not predictable in the strict sense, the 
corresponding rate of progress closely correlates (in the short run) with the 
invested R&D effort. It is essentially this relation to which the New Growth 
Theory refers when assuming that investment into human capital leads to 
economic growth going beyond what is possible by the mere variation of capital 
and labour inputs in traditional production theory. Although this kind of progress 
is essential for the possibility to exploit economies of scale and learning effects, 
it cannot explain progress in the long run as the marginal return on investment 
into human capital diminishes within any single paradigm and so do the 
incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in the first place. 
This dilemma is resolved by the second kind of technological progress: the 
transition between different paradigms. Starting point for such a transition is a 
new basic, that is, a radical innovation that allows a given problem to be solved 
in a (economically) more efficient way, or the emergence of a new demand that 
can effectively be satisfied only within a new paradigm. The latter point is 
particularly relevant for environmental or sustainability problems which can 
often be solved in a new technological paradigm more easily (i.e. less costly) 
than within the established paradigm in which they arose in the first place. 
Contrary to gradual innovations, radical innovations also allow for the realisation 
of scale economies and learning effects that are much larger at the beginning of 
the trajectory than at its end. However, as this offers an attractive prospect for 
radical innovations in the long run, it is this (and other) factors that give rise to a 
barrier to market entry in the short run. For realised economies of scale and 
learning effects (like all other kinds of increasing returns to adoption) constitute 
significant competitive advantages for the established technology which lead to 
a lack of competitiveness for the new technology, if they are not offset by a 
genuine advantage of at least the same size. David (1985) calls this lack of 
contestability of the established technology by even superior competitors a 4  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
‘lock-in’ and considers it as the major reason why decisive aspects of many 
technologies can be influenced at the very beginning of their trajectories but not 
later when they become established. At the same time, this severely restricts 
the possibility to change from any given trajectory to any other – a phenomenon 
for which he coined the term ‘path dependency’.  
The way in which the rigidity of a technological paradigm is discussed by David 
(1985) and modelled by Arthur (1988) could imply that such states of stability 
are omnipresent and, once they turn up, tend to persist for prolonged periods of 
time. Not surprisingly, many economists (e.g. Liebowitz and Margolis 1994) are 
convinced that the latter position grossly overstates the relevance of (in this 
case) network externalities, as this would allow them to become the cause of 
almost ubiquitous market failure. In the latter debate, an intermediate position is 
adopted by Witt (1997) who, while principally acknowledging the relevance of 
network effects, limits their general importance for the function of the market to 
certain limited periods of time. So, periods of stability tend to alternate with 
periods of instability where new networks can be formed. Since in the latter 
case, the direction of technological progress is flexible, the corresponding 
periods are referred to as ‘windows of opportunity’ (David 1987, Erdmann 1993, 
Witt 1997). Disregarding these windows can severely hamper, if not completely 
inhibit, many useful innovations. And even when, in the pursuit of sustainability, 
a new (sustainable) technology is to be pushed successfully by governmental 
regulation with no regard at the specific circumstances, the difference between 
stable and unstable phases can be worth a lot of money.  
In order to minimise not the least the financial effort of such an innovation policy 
towards sustainability, it makes perfect sense to analyse the relation between 
the innovative technology and its conventional counterpart with regard to the 
possible existence and causes of windows of opportunity and to develop a time 
strategy in which the combined effects that could amount to a barrier to entry for 
the new technology are screened over time and action is focused on times 
when the combined required effort is lowest. In view of this, it will be the main 
objective of the following section to identify the most important determinants of 
windows of opportunity and accordingly derive a set of indicators that allow 
political and other decision makers to make a well-founded judgement as to 
whether and when a window of opportunity exists. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  5 
 
3  Determinants of windows of opportunity 
Although, in section 2, windows of opportunity were mainly discussed from the 
economic perspective, their existence is not limited to the techno-economic 
sphere. Due to the fact that many sustainable or environmentally sound 
technologies fail to take advantage of their reduced cost externalisation, the 
government and its regulatory activities typically play a crucial role in over-
coming initial or persistent barriers to competitiveness in the relevant markets. 
If, in this context, the technological transition could only be brought about after a 
major change in the political system, then, in analogy to the techno-economic 
window, the period of instability facilitating this change is now called a political 
‘window of opportunity’.1  
Particularly in the case of environmental innovations with their short-run costs 
often exceeding their short-run benefits, a government or policy makers in 
general typically respond to promoting forces from other parts of the society 
rather than act out of their own initiative. With regard to the fact that such forces 
are often due to major changes in public attitude or perception, it appears to be 
justified to additionally include a socio-cultural window of opportunity in our 
considerations.2
In the following, a variety of determinants of windows of opportunity from all 
three, the techno-economic, the political and socio-cultural sphere is presented. 
Their selections occurred on the basis of a priori theoretical plausibility con-
siderations and ex post after the screening of relevant case studies (see 
Sartorius and Zundel 2005). Due to their large number, it is not possible to 
present them here at length; for a more detailed discussion, the reader is 
therefore referred to Zundel et al. (2005). 
                                            
1   If, by contrast, a change in the political system was not necessary because it was ready to 
support the transition towards the more sustainable technology from the beginning, the 
system is called ‘open’ (without showing a window) (cf. Zundel et al. 2005b). 
2   With his distinction between the problem, politics, and policy streams, Kingdon (1995) 
employs a three-fold distinction of social sub-systems similar to the one used in this paper. 
However, his perspective differs strongly with regard to the role of the policy maker. While in 
this paper, windows are considered as a structural condition that needs to be taken into 
account, but can be influenced only to a limited extent, Kingdon adopts a strategic-actor 
approach in which policy makers can pursue certain objectives through the synchronisation 
of the corresponding streams. Although it would be a long-term goal to include the strategic 
actor also in our approach, it is the purpose of this paper to identify and render operable the 
structural conditions in the first place. 6  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
3.1 Techno-economic  determinants 
Three of the most prominent factors potentially stabilising an established 
technology were already mentioned in preceding parts of this paper. Economies 
of scale and learning by doing refer to the advantage manufacturers can draw 
from specialisation, either by producing large numbers of the same good or by 
accumulating know-how in the course of the production process. By contrast, 
network effects refer to the use of a good, notably positive externalities exerted 
by every additional user of the same good (e.g. tele-communication or operating 
systems of computers). Another stabilising factor are economies of scope, that 
is, the synergy effects resulting from the joint production of different goods (e.g. 
in the chemical industry). Sunk cost can also stabilise a given technology in a 
hardly contestable market where the willingness to invest into a new technology 
is low as long as the old technology is not depreciated. Market structure 
influences the potential of new technologies quite generally as monopolistic and 
oligopolistic supplier markets tend to invest more into the maintenance of the 
existing market barriers than in innovative activities. Whether or not an 
entrepreneur is willing to invest into a new (more sustainable) production or 
product technology will finally depend on the innovation rent he can reasonably 
expect to realise, that is, on the new technology’s potential and risk. In this 
context, it is often quite advantageous for a new technology, if it can draw 
advantage from extra-demand (e.g. in pioneer or niche markets) that cannot be 
met by the established technology. In actual cases, not all techno-economic 
determinants will apply jointly, but none of these factors relies on another one to 
become effective. So, there mode of aggregation is additive.  
3.2 Socio-cultural  determinants 
The socio-cultural system essentially distinguishes two main window determi-
nants. Those leading to the discovery of the environmental or sustainability 
problem (and its potential solution) in the first place and those translating this 
discovery (or a major accident or disaster) into public concern and a willingness 
to accept possible solutions even though they may cause substantial costs or 
require significant changes in the accustomed lifestyle. With regard to their joint 
effects, these factors depend on each other for being effective; their combined 
effect is yielded by multiplying the constituents’ effects. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  7 
 
3.3 Political  determinants 
In the political system, two kinds of determinants are distinguished. The first 
group comprises structural features of a political system such as institutional 
background, interest groups (or, in a wider sense, coalitions of actors), election 
cycles, legislative majorities and knowledge asymmetries. The second group 
contains procedural aspects such as the potential for legislative initiatives, the 
relation between laws that have to pass legislation and ordinances enacted by the 
administration, resubmission and reassessment cycles, corporate structures, participa-
tion and integration into supranational structures. While structural and procedural 
factors in general appear to complement each other in a multiplicative way, the 
specific structural (or procedural) factors tend to work in parallel. Table 1 
summarises the determinants of windows of opportunity in all three systems 
together with the ways in which these determinants may be assessed empiri-
cally.  
Table 1:   Factors determining the stability or instability in each of the three 
subsystems and the indicators used for their operationalisation 
  Effect  Indicators  Operationalisation 
Economies of 
scale 
  Cost (or price) development as a function 
of actual output 
Average capitalisation of 
industry 
Statistical data 
Identification of investment 
cycles 
Recurrent phase-shifted cycling of prices 
and investment 
Sunk costs 
Political regulation  Cost of retro-fitting after regulation,  
delayed investment due to uncertainty of 
measures being taken 
Economies of 
scope 
Pattern of interactions 
between production lines 
Number and relevance of interactions 
between the old (new) technology and the 
entire production network 
Learning by 
doing 
  Cost (or price) development as a function 
of cumulative output 
Direct competition with 
(an)other network(s)  
Market share(s) of the competitor(s), 




ary networks or infrastructure: 
Existence of public standards 
Availability of an adapter 
 
 
Which requirements are met? 
Cost of the adapter, legal admission 





























Market concentration as 
indicator for competition  
Market share of the biggest firm(s), 
Herfindahl index, legal regulations 8  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
  Effect  Indicators  Operationalisation 
Risk ↔ availability of capital  Marginal interest rate, capital share of 
venture capitalists 
Potential / risk 
Problem solving capacity ↔ 
realisation of innovation rent 
Technical properties (benchmarks), 
associated costs 
Readiness to pay for extra-
functions 
Market research 
Existence of natural niche 
markets 




Creation of artificial niche 
markets by means of 
regulation 
(Eco-)taxes, tradable certificates, cost of 
retro-fitting the old technology 
Relevant publications in 
scientific literature, 
contributions to conferences 
Number of relevant articles (keyword 
search) in journals etc.; identification of 





Independence of research  Sources and quantity of research support 
Public concern 






























Relevant articles in 
newspapers, reports in 
broadcast, 
Formation of major protest 
campaigns  
Number of articles or reports over time 
 
 





Norms and standards 
Financial support, tax breaks 
Duties, other barriers to trade 
Specificity of specification 
Interest groups  Resources under control 
(power) 
Structure; homogeneity 
Influence; earlier success 
Number and economic importance of 
represented firms/sector 




Influence of industry in 
hearings 
Number of industry-indepen-




Number, financial support, number and 
size of commissioned projects 
Legislative 
majorities 
Stability of majorities  Size of majority, stability of constituting 
coalition (number and relation of parties) 
Election cycle  Distance to next election  Ditto. 
Political scandals  Deception by possible interest holders  Singular  
constraints 
Catastrophes  Accidents, unexpected discoveries 
Probability of legislative 
initiatives 
Number and relevance of potential 
























Legislative vs. administrative 
regulation  
Number of laws referring to ordinances, 
actual number of ordinances The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  9 
 
  Effect  Indicators  Operationalisation 
Reassessment and 
resubmission cycles 
Deadlines, frequency, possible 
consequences 
Corporate structure  Number, size, and frequency of political 
involvement of corporate organisations 
Participation  Frequency and extent of incorporation of 
political “outsiders” (e.g. NGOs) into the 
decision process 
   
Supranational structures  Share of regulation that is not subject to 
national legislation 
 10  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
4  Selection of case study and data collection 
It is the main objective of this paper to demonstrate the relevance of time 
windows and, by means of them, design a time strategy that could increase the 
effectiveness of governmental support in bringing about a sustainability-oriented 
transition from existing to forthcoming technological trajectories. The first part of 
this research agenda is not entirely new: windows of opportunity were 
postulated repeatedly (David 1987, Erdmann 1993, Witt 1997) and their 
existence for a variety of technological transitions was demonstrated by 
Sartorius and Zundel (2005). However, the latter analyses were retrospective 
and there was hardly an indication that the identified time windows were known 
beforehand – all the less that they were used strategically to facilitate a 
technological transition. In this paper, the window of opportunity concept will be 
applied to an ex ante analysis of which the results will be used to develop a 
political time strategy for the efficient transition to a more sustainable 
technological trajectory in the future. From this perspective, the development of 
the fuel cell (FC) in mobile application is a case in point for this study as it will 
take a couple of years for it to commercialise and there is essentially no way to 
derive the FC-based automobile propulsion system gradually from the well-
established internal combustion engine (ICE). So, the transition towards FC-
based transportation would indeed represent a change between technological 
paradigms – a precondition for the appearance of windows of opportunity.  
Due to the economic and ecological relevance of the transportation sector, the 
fuel cell additionally has the potential to contribute in a significant way to the 
solution of major sustainability problems. Being an electrochemical device that 
converts the chemical energy of a fuel directly to electricity, the FC (in 
combination with an electric engine) not only works more efficient than an ICE 
the efficiency of which is thermodynamically limited; due to its low operating 
temperature, the FC also causes much lower levels of pollution.3 Although it 
depends on the source and conditions of fuel supply whether the FC can bring 
to bear its efficiency advantage with regard to climate protection and fuel 
economy on a well-to-wheel basis (compare e.g. LBSt 2002 and MIT 2000), its 
lesser local pollution with respect to NOx, VOCs and particulate matter is 
undisputed. Especially in combination with hydrogen as a fuel, the FC 
                                            
3   This is true for the polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cell which is the only type of 
fuel cell actually employed in automobile applications because it combines high specific 
power output with short start-up times and a high dynamics. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  11 
 
essentially emits water, which is one reason for hydrogen being appreciated as 
a particularly clean fuel.   
Beyond its ‘clean’ image, further arguments for selecting hydrogen as a fuel for 
the fuel cell in this study are recent strong political commitments in favour of 
hydrogen in the USA and the EU and its higher degree of feasibility in technical 
terms. The former is due to the fact that hydrogen is a secondary energy source 
that can efficiently be produced from a wide variety of primary sources 
(including all fossil, renewable and nuclear) and is transported aboard of 
vehicles more easily than electric power. The latter refers to the problem that 
the technology needed to convert gasoline into a FC fuel is still in its infancy 
and adds significantly to the already high complexity and costs of the FC itself. 
Finally, there is another, more practical reason for investigating the fuel cell: the 
fundamental and long-term character of this innovation renders public research 
institutes and public-private partnerships major drivers of progress in this field. 
As a consequence, a host of relevant information is freely available from 
reports, research publications, conference proceedings and various sites in the 
Internet. Additionally, in-depth interviews were carried out with competent 
partners from the automobile industry and potential infrastructure providers as 
an additional source of information, but more so to seek confirmation of the 
known facts and resolve apparent contradictions.  
At this point, it also needs to be emphasised what the selection of the fuel cell 
and its complementary infrastructure is not to imply. The fact that the 
commercialisation of the fuel cell is not expected to take place within the current 
decade indicates that the technology is associated with high uncertainties in 
economic as well as ecological terms. So, this study is not to be seen as an 
argument for the fuel cell representing the decisive component of a superior 
automotive propulsion system or hydrogen representing the best fuel. Instead, it 
is the purpose of this paper to use the combination of fuel cell and hydrogen 
infrastructure as a relevant instance of a fundamentally new and promising 
technology to demonstrate the usefulness and feasibility of time-strategic 
thinking. 12  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
5  Causes of windows of opportunity for the mobile fuel 
cell and a hydrogen infrastructure 
After choosing (in section 4) hydrogen as the fuel of choice for operating fuel 
cell vehicles (FCV), the development of a time strategy must take into account 
that the transition from gasoline-fuelled ICE vehicles to hydrogen-fuelled FCVs 
actually involves simultaneous transitions with respect to two ‘technologies’: the 
propulsion system and the fuel infrastructure. Due to the economic relevance of 
the corresponding industries – the oil industry as the actual and probably future 
fuel supplier and the automobile industry as foreseen manufacturer of FCVs – it 
is therefore even more important that the government initiates and further 
supports this development with the most suitable instruments and with a time 
strategy that keeps the costs for the concerned industries and the burden for 
the entire economy as low as possible. In order to develop such a time strategy, 
the determinants of windows of opportunity from section 3 will be used in the 
following to identify critical periods of time for both technologies separately, but 
also for their joint implementation. 
5.1 Techno-economic  determinants 
Economies of scale and learning by doing are of extreme importance in the 
automobile industry where the output of a single plant typically exceeds 100,000 
units per year and more than one century was needed to reach the present 
state of technological perfection. By contrast, the current state in FCV develop-
ment is characterised by prototypes or pilot projects with small-scale (i.e. tens of 
vehicles) pre-series. Accordingly, cost estimates for the fuel cell propulsion unit, 
if revealed by the manufacturers at all, are currently around €10,000 per kilowatt 
of power output – a value that has to be compared with about €50 per kilowatt 
for a Diesel ICE car with automatic transmission which, in terms of usage, 
resembles the FCV and will probably compete with it most closely. As shown by 
ADL (2000), a bit more than half of the necessary cost digression by a factor of 
about 200 (i.e. specific costs of about €300 per kW) can be achieved by scaling 
up the production to 500,000 units per year. According to our interviewees from 
automobile industry, however, a major additional contribution is expected to 
come from further technical progress, a better choice of the materials used and 
the growing experience with their manipulation. Gathering this kind of experi-
ence is all the more important as the relative demand for both, fuel cell and ICE 
cars, will depend on their respective operability and reliability at least as much 
as on their performance and price. Apart from the related resource needs, all The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  13 
 
this learning will take time. Accordingly, the time schedule for commercialisation 
of the leading FCV developers (e.g. DaimlerChrysler or General Motors) 
typically extends over more than one decade and comprises four phases (see 
Panik 2002): (1) demonstration of feasibility, (2) market preparation and 
demonstration of ‘fit[ness] for daily use’, (3) ‘ramp up’ and (4) the begin of large-
scale production expected to take place not before the beginning of the next 
decade.4 Especially the later phases are subject to substantial uncertainty such 
that, so far, it is not even sure that phase 4 will take place at all. While the 
development entered phase 2 at the end of the year 2002 with a few tens of 
‘close-to-series’ FCVs, ‘ramp up’ stands for the production and use of hundreds 
or thousands of FCVs under series-like conditions in the later part of this 
decade. A more exact specification of the latter phase in terms of time and 
numbers will only be possible when the uncertainty concerning the prospect of 
commercialisation will have declined below a certain limit. Conversely, the 
actual date and number of FCVs characterising this phase will then provide 
important hints as to the possible launch of phase 4 and, equivalently, to the 
opening of the corresponding window of opportunity. In this context, it was 
indicated by interviewees from car industry that with the beginning of phase 4, a 
minimum of 50,000 FCVs per year would have to be produced and enter the 
market – with the corresponding requirements in terms of infrastructure (see 
below) and demand.5
In contrast to the fuel cell technology, the production, distribution and handling 
of hydrogen essentially represents the state of the art – not for today’s fuel 
suppliers but for the chemical industry which has been handling hydrogen for 
more than a century. Although some scale or learning effects may well be 
realised here (Thomas et al. 2001; Valentin 2001), they are essentially negligi-
ble in comparison to those of the fuel cell technology and, therefore, do not as 
such constitute a window of opportunity in the sense that the opportunity for 
transition is temporally restricted.  
                                            
4  In 1998, large-scale production of FCVs was assumed to commence in 2004, while in 2000, 
the latter figure was shifted to 2006 or 2007. This moving-wall effect is partly due to the 
problems encountered with regard to FCV development. On the other hand, it also 
characterizes the uncertainty faced by the FCV manufacturers and, so long as the 
complementary infrastructure is not available, the lacking competition and, thus, need to 
enter mass production as early as possible. 
5  In the probable case that the number of companies manufacturing FCV exceeds one the 
latter figure will multiply accordingly. The total number will then determine the supply on the 
entire world market. 14  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
However, it is essential that the production and handling of hydrogen in general 
is, and in all probability will remain, significantly more costly on an equivalent-
energy basis than the manufacturing and distribution of gasoline.6 To some 
extent, this disadvantage is levelled out by the higher fuel efficiency of the 
FCVs. However, whether this effect will in fact be strong enough to decrease 
the hydrogen costs of transportation by FCV below the gasoline costs of trans-
portation by ICEV as suggested by Thomas et al. (2001) is doubtful. So, over an 
extended period during its introduction, at least, the fuel costs for a hydrogen-
driven FCV can be expected to be higher than the cost of gasoline for an ICEV.  
Network effects are highly relevant for the mobile fuel cell technology insofar 
as the complementary hydrogen infrastructure is incompatible with the gasoline 
infrastructure existing at present.7 So, the utility of using an FCV will be 
positively correlated with the number of hydrogen stations available for 
necessary refills. Conversely, people will prefer to rely on the established 
ICE/gasoline technology so long as they consider the hydrogen infrastructure as 
insufficient for a convenient operation of FCVs. At the same time, the potential 
suppliers of hydrogen will not invest in a dense network of fuel stations so long 
as the number of hydrogen consumers is small, as this renders their investment 
into infrastructure unprofitable. Clear evidence for this close connection 
between vehicle use and infrastructure availability comes from Argentine, the 
only country world-wide with an alternative fuel and vehicle market making up 
as much as 15 percent of the total national car fleet (of five million). Here, the 
increase in vehicle numbers was accompanied by a proportionate increase in 
the number of CNG fuelling stations reaching about 1000 in the recent past. 
Except for the very first years, the utilisation rate was always high enough to 
ensure profitability (Wurster 2002).  
With regard to a hydrogen infrastructure, the latter problem may even be 
somewhat relaxed by the fact that hydrogen fuelling stations could additionally 
be used by hydrogen-driven ICE vehicles (developed by e.g. BMW) which could 
be available much sooner (and at lower prices) than FCVs. A further potential 
cause for a decrease in the cost of conversion consists in a certain comple-
                                            
6  The latter argument applies even more if hydrogen is to be made from renewable sources. 
To remain fair, however, one would then have to compare ‘renewable hydrogen’ with 
gasoline (or Diesel) also from renewable sources (e.g. rapeseed). 
7  In principle, gasoline reforming could serve as a gateway technology (David and Bunn 1987) 
to resolve this incompatibility, but it adds significantly to the costs and technical complexity of 
the entire system. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  15 
 
mentarity between a potential hydrogen infrastructure and the extensive supply 
network for natural gas found in countries like Germany, the Netherlands and 
the UK. For it is reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of the 
hydrogen fuel will be produced from natural gas. Only in the very beginning 
(when hydrogen is distributed as a liquid to 'pioneer' fuel stations by truck) and 
after the hydrogen infrastructure reaches a certain degree of maturation (when 
the network of fuel stations is dense enough that it pays to distribute gaseous 
hydrogen via pipelines), will hydrogen be manufactured in centralised facilities. 
Over the major part of the initial installation of that infrastructure, however, 
hydrogen will preferably be produced in small on-site reformers, at the fuel 
station – with the necessity for corresponding natural gas supply (Ogden 1999).  
Nevertheless, this does not imply a spontaneous solution of the general 
‘chicken and egg’ problem as the costs are still high enough and the willingness 
of potential fuel suppliers to make the necessary investments in advance is 
further reduced by the uncertainty as to whether the FCV manufacturers will 
follow at all.  
Economies of scope do neither stabilise the ICE technology with respect to a 
transition to FCVs, nor the production and distribution of gasoline with respect 
to hydrogen. So, they do not give rise to a limitation in the opportunity for 
technological transition in both fields. On the other hand, when used as storage 
and balancing medium for electricity, hydrogen is complementary to renewable 
energy sources such as wind turbines and photovoltaic cells. Additionally, fuel 
cells are technically related to electrolysers that are used to produce just this 
hydrogen from electricity. So, once a hydrogen grid is in place, it can be 
expected that renewable electricity and hydrogen will stabilize each other. 
Sunk costs are irrelevant for both hydrogen and fuel cell as the transition is 
expected to proceed with only moderate pace and over extended periods of 
time such that existing production facilities and infrastructure will not have to be 
put out of operation prematurely.  
Market structure is not relevant as an obstacle to the development of FCVs 
because the competition between car manufacturers is quite strong. So far, this 
competition does not come to bear with regard to the FCV; however, this 
situation will change as soon as a suitable infrastructure exists. While the same 
argument basically applies for the current providers of fuel infrastructure, it is 
the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem that gives rise to an asymmetry with 
regard to expectations and, thus, decreases the incentives (and the 
competition) for setting up a hydrogen infrastructure. This is one more reason 16  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
as to why (regulatory) incentives trying to favour the transition towards fuel cell 
and hydrogen will have to focus on the infrastructure rather than to the 
propulsion system. On the other hand, it is told by one interviewee that the 
downstream oil industry as the traditional supplier of gasoline will not be willing 
to leave the hydrogen fuel business to another (e.g. chemical) industry since 
they on their own got a lot of experience in producing and using hydrogen (e.g. 
in cracking processes) and will prefer to remain fuel supplier also for a new 
generation of hydrogen-driven vehicles. 
Extra-demand. All car manufacturers are convinced that the willingness to pay 
significantly more for an FCV than for a comparable ICE vehicle (e.g. because 
of its environmental advantages or its representative value) will be limited to a 
small number of consumers and is far too low to render the sale of FCVs a 
profitable business in the first phase of mass commercialisation. For the 
average buyer (in Europe), an FCV is worth as much as an advanced (low-
noise) Diesel car with automatic transmission. Moreover, it was stressed by all 
interviewees from car industry that, due to a fundamentally conservative attitude 
prevalent on the demand side of the automobile market, even equally expensive 
FCVs will not sell if they are not at least as good as ICE vehicles in most 
relevant performance parameters and even somewhat better in some. So, in 
order to enter the mass market successfully, the FCV has to show right from the 
beginning all those characteristics that took more than a century to emerge in 
the case of the ICE development. Hardly anything could be more disastrous for 
the successful commercialisation of FCVs than their premature introduction. 
This and the limited early availability of fuelling infrastructure severely restrict 
the potential use of niche markets specifically for the FCV.  
By contrast, in a broader sense, fuel cell buses constitute a rather effective 
niche market for fuel cell-based propulsion systems. They are now being tested 
in public transportation in the course of the EU-sponsored CUTE project and in 
a series of more local projects across Europe and the USA. The requirements 
for their operation are basically similar to those for FC passenger cars but not 
quite as strict (i.e. lower specific power required and more space available for 
the FC installation). Also, since they are operated in fleets, the supply with 
hydrogen can be ensured more easily. 
A few more niche markets for the fuel cell in general exist (e.g. stationary fuel 
cells or fuel cells as power supply for transportable or remote devices). 
However, the accruing of important synergy effects from them remains doubtful 
since the specific technical (and economic) conditions of their operation are The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  17 
 
quite different from those of the FCV. The latter argument applies all the more, if 
different types of fuel cells (e.g. solid oxide or molten carbonate as opposed to 
PEM) are employed.  
Potential and risk. In the short run, a variety of severe technical problems have 
to be solved before competition can be achieved. In the longer run, representa-
tives of many car manufacturers assure that the technical problems could be 
solved. Whether or not FCVs and the complementary hydrogen supply can then 
be commercialized successfully, will depend on the right political conditions, 
that is, on the political willingness to opt for hydrogen as a alternative secondary 
energy source and to compensate it for its higher costs (which could be 
interpreted as reflecting its capability to internalise the external costs of carbon 
dioxide emission) and to reward the fuel cell for its better fuel efficiency and its 
lesser air pollution. Another important condition for the commercial success of 
FCVs (as well as hydrogen) will be the consumers’ view of it as a superior 
alternative. 
5.2 Socio-cultural  determinants 
Problem discovery and public concern. There is a broad scientific consensus 
that continued man-made greenhouse gas emissions would cause major 
changes in the earth climate with severe ecological consequences (IPCC 2001). 
It is evident that the conditions of human live would be concerned as well, but 
the economic consequences are so far rather unclear. Due to this uncertainty 
and the lack of an immediate temporal connection between cause and effect, 
public concern about a possible climate change is somewhat limited. Neverthe-
less, the majority of governments of the world came to agree in the Kyoto 
protocol that the industrial countries must reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by about five percent by the year 2012. FCVs, while coming too late 
to make a significant contribution to the latter goal, could well play a role in the 
longer run when an extension of the Kyoto protocol may come into effect. So, 
since (in Europe) climate change is already part of the political agenda, problem 
confirmation and public concern are now not so relevant anymore. 
In the USA, it is not quite as easy to distinguish the influences of public and 
political concern with regard to securing the national energy supply. However, 
since the latter objective is part of the more general ‘war against international 
terrorism’, the dominance of political leadership is evident here as well. 18  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
With regard to the importance of transportation and energy supply in all 
industrial economies, the failure of FCVs or the hydrogen infrastructure to find 
public acceptance would easily rule them out as possible alternatives. While 
the hydrogen infrastructure seems to be more crucial in this respect, in Europe 
at least, its good reputation as a clean energy source seems to dominate 
adversely perceived safety issues (LBSt 1998). 
5.3 Political  determinants 
Institutional integration. Until now, the use of hydrogen was mainly restricted 
to industrial production sites and subject to strict regulation. In order to allow for 
a safe, but nevertheless convenient use of hydrogen in FCVs, these regulations 
and many related technical standards need to be changed or newly developed. 
In the EU, such standards were developed by the European Integrated 
Hydrogen Project until 2004. 
Subsidisation in favour of the FCV (e.g. bonus or tax exemption for the buyer) 
will be feasible, but will probably not go beyond what is conceded to any other 
propulsion system with comparable environmental properties. Similarly, 
hydrogen can be expected to benefit from tax exemptions similar to those 
granted to compressed natural gas. This would be enough to render the price of 
fossil fuel-based hydrogen competitive with regular gasoline. In any case, this 
implies that the present system (i.e. ICE/gasoline) will not be particularly 
favoured (and the FCV/hydrogen system disfavoured) by the currently prevail-
ing institutional setting. 
Interest groups. In Germany, in particular, car manufacturing is an important 
part of the industrial structure. Direct employment in the automobile industry 
accounts for 12 percent of the industrial work force (DIW 2000). Since FCVs are 
developed and will be manufactured by the automobile industry, and under the 
assumption that the oil industry as actual gasoline supplier will also be involved 
in the production and distribution of hydrogen, interest groups are not expected 
to oppose the transition to the new technologies. To the contrary, the way the 
two industries are actually involved in initiatives like HyWays in the EU and 
FreedomCAR in the USA implies that they both understand FCV/hydrogen as a 
great chance for the future of their businesses. With regard to the details of 
such a transition, the agreement of the industries concerned will depend on the 
appropriate conditions concerning especially the time path and financial support 
(mainly for the oil industry). The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  19 
 
Knowledge asymmetries between the government and the FCV or car 
industry are not relevant insofar as the former is not expected to sponsor the 
commercialisation of FCVs directly. The asymmetry is however relevant with 
regard to the earliest point in time at which commercialisation could begin and a 
basic hydrogen infrastructure would have to be in place. If this date is chosen to 
be too early, utilisation and profitability of the infrastructure will be low. On the 
other hand, earlier installation of the infrastructure could force the potential 
manufacturers of FCVs to engage in fierce competition with each other and thus 
to reveal the true state of their technical development. This would allow for the 
resolution of the latter part of the asymmetry and lead to the earliest possible 
market launch of FCV – however at the risk of being premature and very costly.  
Certain knowledge asymmetries could also be relevant with regard to the costs 
of the hydrogen infrastructure and the size of the necessary subsidies. Whether 
or not they will be sufficient to delay or even prevent the construction of the 
infrastructure, eventually depends on the political attitude and, accordingly, the 
parliamentary majorities (see below) prevailing in the relevant time period.  
Election cycles are irrelevant since the political measures under consideration 
do not immediately increase the costs to be borne by the voters. In the long run, 
the assignment of accruing costs to the beginning or end of a specific election 
period will simply be impossible.  
Legislative majorities and their change are important preconditions for the 
opening and closure of windows of opportunity as the usefulness and success-
ful implementation of FCVs and the complementary infrastructure depends on 
political long-term objectives that can change at any time as the result of a 
corresponding change in the government. While the majorities as such are 
essentially unpredictable and could therefore seriously undermine the formation 
of a long-term time strategy, undergoing a corresponding commitment on a 
higher, for instance supra-national level (see below) could be an effective way 
to generally reduce the influence of changing majorities.  
Singular restrictions. Basically, the budget available for each political measure 
is in some way related to the performance of an economy and, accordingly, the 
total budget available to the government. This relation can be subject to a 
significant change once public (and political) concern is changed by a dramatic 
exogenous event (e.g. a catastrophe or accident) or one of the parties 
concerned gains or loses reputation. More frequent or powerful indications of a 
dramatic (i.e. harmful) change in the global (or local) climate could be a case in 20  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
point. But as majorities and singularities are essentially unpredictable, they will 
not be integrated in the time strategy to be developed. 
Political procedures. Within the EU, the actual engagement in favour of 
hydrogen (see e.g. the ‘High-Level Group’) and, to a lower extent, FCVs is 
based on the joint obligation taken on in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Individual countries can influence the making of 
such decisions, but once the process is completed, a deviation is not easily 
possible. This gives the EU policy and that of its member countries a higher 
degree of continuity. In the USA, by contrast, important initiatives can be 
launched by small groups of, or even single, policy makers. Additionally the 
USA refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, in his fight against 
the international terrorism and his search for resource independence President 
George W. Bush in 2003 announced a strong initiative in favour of hydrogen as 
a future substitute for oil. It remains to be seen whether the reach of the 
initiative will exceed Bush’s election term.  
5.4  Time-critical factors – a conclusion 
After analysing a variety of potential determinants of windows of opportunity in 
the preceding part of this section, it became evident that in the case of the 
mobile fuel cell and its hydrogen infrastructure, many determinants are not 
relevant because they do not play a role as potential stabilising factors for the 
established gasoline-based ICE technology. In Table 2, those irrelevant factors 
are marked by ‘0’. The remaining factors could have played a role in locking out 
the new technologies, but during the period of analysis, many of them in fact 
never do. They constitute a ‘window’ that is open all the time and are marked by 
‘1’. Fortunately, a window that never opens and would thereby inhibit any kind 
of strategy could not be identified. Finally, seven time-critical determinants of a 
potential window of opportunity were found to indeed constitute a window. They 
are marked by ‘X’ in Table 2 and will be used for the development of a time 
strategy in the next section.  The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  21 
 
Table 2:  Characterisation of the determinants of windows of opportunity for 
automobile fuel cells and a hydrogen infrastructure 
Subsystem  Determinants Relevance*
Economies of scale / learning by doing  X 
Network effects  X 
Economies of scope / complementarities  1 
Sunk costs  0 




Potential / risk  X 
Problem discovery / confirmation  1 
Public concern  0 
Socio-
cultural 
Acceptance of solution(s)  1 
Institutional integration  X 
Interest groups  1 
Knowledge asymmetries  1 
Election cycle  0 
Legislative majorities  X 
Singular restrictions  X 
Political 
Political procedures  X 
* X = time-critical, 1 = relevant, but not time-critical, 0 = irrelevant 22  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
6  Development of a time strategy  
In order to develop a successful innovation policy for the mobile fuel cell and its 
infrastructure, it is useful not to consider the time-critical factors (X) in the order 
listed in Table 2, but to proceed along the time scale in which the time-critical 
determinants become effective. Additionally, Zundel et al. (2005b) distinguish 
four time-strategic approaches corresponding to the developmental stage of the 
new technology. If the new technology is nearly competitive and the window 
exists already, it can be used immediately. If the technology is promising but far 
from competitive and the window is foreseen somewhere in the future, it makes 
sense to support the development and prepare the window in order to use it as 
soon as possible. If a strong public or political pressure towards technological 
change does not allow policy makers to wait, they can make the more risky 
attempt to force the technological development and create a window. Finally, it 
can be useful to maintain a window, when the economic success of one new 
technology would itself lock-out other even more promising new technologies. 
Since window creation is not an issue and window maintenance is not important 
in this case, only the former two strategies will be drawn up in this paper. 
6.1 Window  preparation 
The first determinant to be considered is the institutional integration or, more 
specifically, the specific regulations concerning the operation of a hydrogen 
infrastructure and the transport of hydrogen in FCVs. Within the EU, the 
necessary changes are currently under way and will probably be completed by 
the year 2004 or 2005.  
The next point relates to the basic potential and risk of FCVs (and hydrogen) in 
terms of profitability. At present, it is not only unclear when the commercialisa-
tion of FCVs can be expected to begin; it is even unsure whether it will take 
place at all. This is only in part a question of technical feasibility. Instead, the 
main question is: will there be sufficient demand? Why should people buy an 
FCV? Here, it would be an important contribution in terms of political guidance 
to make clear in the first place that, together with hydrogen, FCVs are indeed 
considered a possible solution to an urgent environmental or sustainability 
problem and appropriate support will be provided. At the moment, in Germany, 
political signals going in that direction are far from unambiguous; the rather low 
importance assigned to FCVs and a hydrogen infrastructure by the German 
government is reflected in its low subsidy efforts (compared with the USA or 
Japan, see HyWeb 2000) and in the opinion expressed by the Federal The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  23 
 
Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) that FCV and hydrogen may become 
useful alternatives only in the longer run – 2040 and later. So, many car 
manufacturers continue to be engaged in the technical development of FCVs in 
order to maintain their competitiveness, but due to the immense risk associated 
with the commercialisation of a completely new type of car, they are not in a 
hurry with regard to the actual market introduction.8 If politics was really 
interested in the FCV being commercialised as quickly as possible, it could 
indeed support this process by simply demonstrating its interest more explicitly. 
A way of doing so could consist in the government and its agencies expressing 
a more coherent, positive, attitude towards FCVs and in a stronger support of 
R&D and demonstration projects in this field. The latter point is important not 
only for the maintenance of technological progress; it also contributes to people 
developing a higher familiarity with, and trust in, the new technology. It needs to 
be emphasised, however, that at this early stage with high uncertainty involved, 
policy should support a variety of technological options rather than a specific 
one in order to allow for the possibility of experimentation. A lucid example for 
this kind of approach is the Californian Fuel Cell Partnership, a cooperation of 
major US-based car and fuel cell manufacturers, oil companies and govern-
mental agencies which, while trying to push the mobile fuel cell, do not limit 
themselves with regard to the fuel options to be investigated. 
Although the influence of changing parliamentary majorities and singular events 
on technological progress cannot be affected by single policy makers, some 
procedural aspects in the political system allow for a partial compensation of 
this shortcoming. Commitments to pursue long-term political objectives and the 
joining into supra-national political agreements (as e.g. the Kyoto Protocol) are 
some of the more prominent means to ensure the continuity of policy. So, with 
regard to the technologies considered here, an extension of the Kyoto Protocol 
into another decade or the inclusion of (so far) outsiders such as the USA could 
be quite advantageous. 
So far, the proposals for governmental measures in support of the fuel cell and 
hydrogen technology path are only moderately time-critical insofar as it is more 
crucial that those measures are taken at all than when they are taken exactly. 
Due to this more conditional character, they help to prepare a(n anticipated) 
                                            
8  Due to the current lack of a suitable infrastructure, there is no actual risk that a competitor 
could begin with the mass production of FCVs. So, competition so far proceeds on the 
technical level rather than with regard to commercialization.   24  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
window of opportunity. By contrast, a variety of more time-critical measures are 
discussed in the following that are related to the opening of a window more 
directly.  
6.2  Use of a window 
In order to allow FCVs to become (cost) competitive with regular ICE vehicles, it 
is necessary to make extensive use of economies of scale with annual produc-
tion capacities exceeding 50,000 units per plant right from the beginning (This 
figure specifies the slope of the FCV curves in Figure 1 at the right-hand side of 
their respective kinks). Such quantities of FCVs will however be sold only, if the 
potential users can rely on a satisfactory network of complementary (hydrogen) 
infrastructure. From the FCV manufacturers’ perspective, a certain proportion of 
this infrastructure will need to be assembled prior to the launch of FCV 
commercialisation and the remainder as quickly as possible afterwards. In order 
to keep the financial losses of infrastructure providers from under-utilised 
infrastructure low, it is, on the other hand, essential that the installation of the 
infrastructure occur neither too early nor too quickly. In this trade-off, the 
government plays a central role as coordinator and mediator, and it is this point 
where the time strategy in the narrower sense sets in. After a roadmap for the 
development of the smallest, but nevertheless effective, hydrogen infrastructure 
has been specified (see e.g. Wurster (2002) for Germany and Melaina (2002) 
for the USA), it is necessary to reach an agreement between the FCV 
manufacturers and the infrastructure providers specifying the schedule for both 
the mass production of FCVs and the installation of the infrastructure. Addition-
ally, it may be necessary to reach an agreement as to how the unrecoverable 
capital costs of (initially) under-utilised infrastructure are to be shared between 
the different parties. In the absence of uncertainty, it could well be argued that 
these costs are an investment into the business of the infrastructure provider to 
sell hydrogen and, therefore, are to be borne by him alone. Since it may not be 
that sure, however, that the FCV manufacturers can really produce (and sell!) 
according to the agreed-upon schedule, it appears to be more incentive-
compatible to make the latter party pay a certain specified part of these costs. 
With regard to the size of the necessary initial investments, it may nevertheless 
turn out that both industries find themselves incapable of even commonly 
bearing the risk of a rapid enough installation of the necessary infrastructure. It 
would then be up to the government to (partially) subsidise the construction of 
the basic infrastructure and, thus, to render its schedule compatible with the 
requirements of the FCV manufacturers. In Figure 1, this effect is reflected in The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  25 
 
the different slopes of the curves ‘H2slow’ (without specific governmental 
support) and ‘H2fast’ (with support). On the other hand, in order not to waste the 
tax payers’ money, the major launch of the infrastructure should precede the 
launch of FCV commercialisation by not more than, say, a year or two. But how 
does the government know when the mass production of FCVs can be 
expected to start without exclusively relying on the corresponding, possibly 
biased, information from the industry (see knowledge asymmetries, above)? 
Although policy can influence this point to some extent through measures of 
window preparation (see above), only the FCV manufacturers will know this 
point exactly. Actual predictions reach from 2010 to the mid or even end of the 
next decade (illustrated by the curves ‘FCVearly’ and ‘FCVlate’, respectively, in 
Figure 1). Beside direct communication between the parties involved within 
institutional arrangements such as the Verkehrswirtschaftliche Energiestrategie 
(energy strategy for transportation, Germany) or the Californian Fuel Cell 
Partnership (USA), one way to reduce this uncertainty is to have a closer look at 
the specific shape of the FCV production curve (as displayed in Figure 1): about 
four years prior to the potential big kink of a beginning mass production, a much 
smaller kink indicates the beginning of the ‘ramp-up’ phase. This phase is 
essential as FCVs are a completely new type of vehicle such that they and their 
production facilities need to be subjected to a final large-scale operability and 
reliability test. While this phase could hardly be shorter than four years, there is 
no guarantee that the next phase (i.e. mass production) will ever be entered. 
Here, the number of FCVs produced in the ramp-up phase may be a useful 
indicator: while output figures in the, say, lower hundreds would raise doubts 
about a foreseeable transition into mass production, the high costs alone of 
producing several thousands of FCVs would only make sense in terms of an 
investment, if they were followed by the beginning of mass production not too 
much later. So, it is the size of the ramp-up production as well as its 
chronological appearance that allows policy makers to independently form 
expectations about the schedule and the appropriate measures to push the 
commercialisation of FCVs. 
With regard to potential alternatives to FCVs and hydrogen, it needs to be 
emphasised that the actual use of the window by building up the infrastructure 
leads to the closure of windows for all those (new) fuels that could not be 
distributed by the then existing infrastructures. In this sense and in view of the 
trade-off between methanol and hydrogen, representatives of the oil industry 
made clear that they would under no circumstances support more than one new 
fuel alternative. 26  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
Figure 1:  Time-critical techno-economic aspects of a possible time strategy 
for a technology policy in favour of the mobile fuel cell and a hydro-
gen infrastructure. The beginning of the ramp-up phase can serve 
as an indicator for the beginning of commercialisation. It is crucial 
that the installation of the infrastructure (H2fast) precedes the mass 























































6.3  Closure of the window and beyond 
After a while, the strong increase in the number of FCV users together with 
strong initial learning and scale effects would considerably relax the competitive 
situation of the new technology. At the same time, this would increase the 
degree of utilisation of the hydrogen infrastructure such that a subsidisation 
beyond a basic network of fuel stations (about 1000 in Germany) would not be 
necessary. Particularly when based on regenerative sources, the production 
and distribution of hydrogen would probably remain more costly than that of 
gasoline and Diesel even in the long run. This would make it necessary to 
permanently subject the latter fuels to a higher tax than hydrogen. The resulting 
higher price for fuels in general should then be considered as to reflect the 
internalised costs of environmental pollution and climate protection. The case of the mobile fuel cell and its infrastructure  27 
 
7 Conclusion 
The automobile fuel cell can play an important role as solution to problems 
related to climate protection, sustainable resource use, and avoidance of local 
emissions from transportation. Whether or not it really gets a chance to bring to 
bear these advantages depends on the willingness and capability of a govern-
ment to clear up a variety of obstacles to the successful market entry. While, in 
this respect, the emphasis is traditionally put on static effects such as external-
ities, the present analysis shows that a more important role is played by 
dynamic effects leading to the opening and closure of windows of opportunity – 
periods in which a successful transition is greatly facilitated.  
Important determinants for such a window were found to be economies of scale, 
learning and network effects – the latter because FCVs will exert the most 
advantageous effects in combination with hydrogen for which an infrastructure 
needs to be installed first. Other more political determinants of windows of 
opportunity are institutional integration, supra-national agreements and political 
guidance – the latter expressing a kind of commitment for the technology in 
question, the second maintaining this commitment despite possible changes in 
parliamentary majorities. Although no obstacles against the mobile fuel cell are 
expected to accrue in the social sphere, political guidance could be influential 
here as well by bringing about a more positive social attitude towards the new 
technology. 
When developing a time strategy for the successful implementation of the 
mobile fuel cell technology by means of the above-mentioned factors, two major 
stages could be distinguished. In the first phase of preparation of a window of 
opportunity, the opening of an anticipated window is supported by adaptation of 
the institutional framework to the new technology and by subsidising 
demonstration projects that allow the companies involved to realise important 
learning effects. Only when the window is actually about to open, that is, the 
fuel cell itself is ready for commercialisation, the second phase of using the 
opening window sets in. Now, policy makers are supposed to adjust the basic 
conditions (such as the complementary infrastructure) in such a way that the 
window can effectively translate into a successful commercialisation. 
In the longer run, most of the measures undertaken to open and use the 
window of opportunity for the mobile fuel cell can successively be withdrawn 
once the new technology has reached a state comparable to that of the incum-
bent technology. From this point on, it should be left to the market to select the 
technology that is in fact superior. 28  Time strategies in environmental innovation policy 
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